Mike Arias
Managing Partner
Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Team LLP
Phone: (310) 844-9696
Email: mike@asstlawyers.com
Uri H. Niv
Trial Counsel and Leader of the Elder Abuse Practice Group
Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Team LLP
At stake in the California Supreme Court's review of Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., is whether wrongful death claims based on elder or dependent adult abuse can be forced into arbitration solely through agreements signed by the decedent. See Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 5th 1125, 321 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23 (2024). In the post-Ruiz and Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) landscape, Holland brings key issues to the forefront--consent, accountability, and whether non-signatory heirs have a right to seek justice in open court.
The California Supreme Court heard oral arguments on these issues on May 21, 2025, and its forthcoming ruling is expected to be a landmark decision--regardless of whether it affirms or overturns the lower court's ruling.
Arbitration and the limits of consent
It is a foundational principle of arbitration law that a party may not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute absent a clear and voluntary agreement to do so. Goldman v. Sunbridge Healthcare, LLC, 220 Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1178, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 11, 25 (2013) (citing Lee v. S. Cal. Univ. for Prof'l Studies, 148 Cal. App. 4th 782, 786, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134 (2007). However, in Ruiz v. Podolsky, the California Supreme Court articulated a significant exception to this general rule. See Ruiz v. Podolsky, 50 Cal. 4th 838, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263, 237 P.3d 584 (2010). The court held that an arbitration agreement executed by a patient prior to death was enforceable against the patient's heirs in a subsequent wrongful death action--even though the heirs never signed it. Id. at 854.
The legal framework: Code of Civil Procedure Section 1295 and
MICRA
The Ruiz Court held that compelled arbitration was permissible under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, which governs arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases, because it was consistent with the policy objectives of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the landmark 1975 tort reform statute. Id. at 843-849. MICRA was enacted to contain healthcare costs by, among other measures, imposing a cap on non-economic damages--specifically limiting compensation for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Reigelsperger v. Siller, 40 Cal. 4th 574, 577, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 889, 150 P.3d 764, 766 (2007) (citing Stats. 1975, 2d Ex. Sess. 1975-1976, ch. 1, § 26.6, at 3975-3976).
Subsequent case law has refined and circumscribed the exception
recognized in Ruiz, establishing three conditions for its application
that require the arbitration agreement to have (1) strict compliance with Code
of Civil Procedure section 1295's formal requirements, (2) clear intent to bind
both the patient-signatory and their heirs in the event of a wrongful death
claim; and (3) the claims must arise directly from allegations of professional
medical negligence within the scope of MICRA. Id. at
577; Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., 212 Cal. App. 4th
674, 683, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 280 (2013).
Judicial resistance to expanding Ruiz
Despite the limits set by Ruiz, elder care facilities
continue to argue that arbitration should apply to claims brought by third
parties, particularly heirs in wrongful death and elder abuse actions. These
arguments have largely failed. In Bush v. Horizon West, the Court of
Appeal held that wrongful death claims brought by heirs in their personal
capacity fall outside section 1295. Bush
v. Horizon W., Inc. 205
Cal. App. 4th 924, 929, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 258, 262, as modified (Apr. 30, 2012)
("Without delving into the Ruiz opinion further, it is apparent that
the Supreme Court's holding there does not apply here because this case does
not involve a wrongful death claim by Jennings predicated on medical
malpractice, but instead involves a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress predicated on alleged elder abuse"). Similarly, in Daniels
v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., the court rejected the notion that a
residential care facility was an "extension" of a health care facility for
arbitration purposes. Daniels,
supra, at 684. Most definitively, in Avila v. Southern California
Specialty Care, Inc., the court held that section 1295 does not apply to
elder abuse claims and reaffirmed that arbitrability depends on the nature of
the allegations--not the facility's licensure status. Avila v. S. California
Specialty Care, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 842, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 48
(2018). Thus, where the core allegations sound in elder abuse under EADACPA, Ruiz
does not apply, and heirs cannot be compelled to arbitrate based solely on the
decedent's agreement.
Background of Holland: The claims and trial court ruling
Against this legal backdrop, the Court of Appeal in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. considered whether heirs could be compelled to arbitrate claims arising from the death of a dependent adult at a skilled nursing facility (SNF). Holland, supra, at 1129. The decedent's parents sued, asserting four causes of action: (1) dependent adult abuse; (2) negligence; (3) violation of residents' rights under Health and Safety Code section 1430(b); and (4) wrongful death. Id. The first three causes of action were asserted as survivor claims, whereas the wrongful death claim was independently held by the parents as statutory heirs.
The trial court enforced arbitration of the three survivor claims--dependent adult abuse, negligence, and violation of residents' rights--finding they belonged to the decedent's estate and fell within the scope of the agreement. Holland, supra, at 1130. However, relying on Avila, the court declined to compel arbitration of the parents' wrongful death claim, concluding it was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15600 et seq.), not professional negligence, and thus fell outside the reach of section 1295 and Ruiz. Id.
Court of Appeal reverses: Elder abuse vs. professional negligence
Conversely, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's
reasoning, reversed the ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1128. It first
observed that the arbitration agreement met the formal requirements of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1295 and clearly expressed intent to bind the
decedent's heirs, satisfying the first two Ruiz prongs. Id. at
1133. As to the third element, the court reviewed the complaint and found that
the "bare bones" allegations--failure to meet duties owed to the decedent
resulting in death--sounded in professional negligence. Id.
The court further emphasized that allegations concerning the facility's failure to prevent falls and infections described conduct typical of negligent acts committed while providing professional health care services. Id. As such, the Court concluded that the claim fell within the ambit of medical malpractice under section 1295 and Ruiz, rather than constituting a claim of elder abuse as contemplated in Avila. Id. Accordingly, the court held that compelled arbitration of the wrongful death claim was proper under the circumstances. Id.
The Court of Appeal proceeded further, venturing into the doctrinally unsettled terrain separating medical malpractice from elder abuse. In the final portion of its opinion, the court rejected the view that Ruiz is categorically limited to wrongful death claims arising strictly from medical malpractice, reasoning that such limitations are inapplicable where the allegations "sound in professional negligence." However, the court offered little analytical clarity regarding what specific aspects of the complaint--beyond its "bare bones" nature and the fact that it was brought against a medical facility--sufficed to characterize it as professional negligence. Id.
The court further opined, in dicta, that even if wrongful death claims based on dependent adult abuse fall outside the ambit of Ruiz, plaintiffs failed to plead abuse with sufficient particularity. As a result, they could not avoid arbitration through vague or strategically crafted allegations. However, the court did not clarify what level of specificity would be required to invoke elder abuse protections.
Oral argument heard before the California Supreme Court: Key concerns
raised
At oral argument,
the California Supreme Court Justices raised concerns over how to distinguish
professional negligence from custodial neglect in wrongful death claims brought
by non-signatory heirs and emphasized the need for greater specificity in the complaint
to determine whether arbitration should be compelled. See Holland v.
Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., No. S285429, Oral Arg. Tr. at 1030 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. May 21, 2025), https://jcc.granicus.com/player/clip/5972?meta_id=130966. The Justices also considered whether
vaguely pled allegations should compel arbitration by default, or whether
plaintiffs should first be granted leave to amend. Underlying the Justices'
inquiries were broader concerns about procedural fairness, the constitutional
rights of non-signatories, and the complex, dual role of skilled nursing
facilities--as both providers of medical treatment and custodial care.
Conclusion:
The need to protect our elders and plead with particularity
The questions
raised by the California Supreme Court in Holland v. Silverscreen
reflect a broader effort to clarify when arbitration may be compelled and when
statutory elder abuse protections must take precedence.
If society is to
take seriously the imperative of protecting its elderly--particularly in cases
where abuse or neglect results in death--then it must also safeguard the legal
rights of surviving family members. Permitting wrongful death claims to be
compelled into arbitration based solely on allegations in a vaguely drafted
complaint without the opportunity to amend threatens to extinguish those rights
without meaningful consent. Regardless of how the California Supreme Court
rules, one thing is very clear: allegations of elder abuse must be pled with
clarity and specificity to avoid compelled arbitration and ensure families get
their day in court.