LA28's drone security challenge

During this summer's FIFA World Cup, federal authorities seized more than 700 unauthorized drones in restricted airspace near tournament venues across the United States--including 59 drones in Los Angeles. Fortunately, the tournament ended without a major security incident. No drone crashes, no dangerous payloads, no resulting death or destruction.

Luck played a role, but so did careful planning, including extensive coordination among local, state and federal authorities, supported by new legal powers and grants for state and local counter-drone efforts.

The key takeaway for the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Los Angeles: start planning now!

The Los Angeles Games will have a sprawling footprint, involving multiple municipalities and complex event structures that, unlike the more contained World Cup, extend beyond specific stadiums. Organizers anticipate more than 40 competition venues, plus a marathon route, fan zones, the athletes' village and shuttle buses.

Several events will be held along the waterfront--meaning that organizers need to think about risks from both the sky and the sea, particularly as submersible drones become more widely available and technologically sophisticated. The security of nearby critical infrastructure is also key. An attack on the electric grid or a local transit system could have cascading effects on the Games, even if no specific LA28 venue is the target of the attack.

Effective security will involve extensive coordination between organizers, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and local, state and federal authorities, among others. Key considerations include:

Map out flight restrictions: During the World Cup, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established nearly 250 temporary flight restrictions above stadiums and event sites. Flight restrictions establish rules on who can operate drones in a certain area, creating a basis for enforcement against violators. LA28 organizers should, in conjunction with state and local authorities, start mapping out the security footprint now, venue by venue, to determine where similar restrictions may be warranted.

The importance of critical infrastructure and the pending "2209 Rule": In May, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which would allow fixed critical infrastructure sites to request certain flight restrictions over their facilities. (This is known as the "2209 Rule," given that it was first mandated in Section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016--a full decade ago.) The comment period closed several months ago, and the FAA is reviewing more than 1,000 comments, including several submissions from critical infrastructure entities seeking changes to address security concerns more effectively. Ideally, the final rule will resolve those concerns and be implemented in time to protect critical infrastructure near the Games.

Limited mitigation authorities: Even when an event security team detects unauthorized or potentially malicious drones near the Games, it cannot independently land them safely, return them to their operators or take other mitigation measures. Only certain federal agencies and trained state and local officials have the authority to take these kinds of actions against drone threats, and even their powers remain constrained. State and local officials first received mitigation authority last year, via the SAFER SKIES Act in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, and they may exercise it only after completing FBI-facilitated training. The training is currently offered at a single facility in Huntsville, Alabama, with limited capacity. A recently issued Interim Final Rule allows the attorney general to designate additional training sites, but none have yet been added. The attorney general should do so promptly, and state and local officials should pursue all available training opportunities.

Congress should also take steps to extend mitigation authority to trained security teams at critical infrastructure facilities or locations where large numbers of people gather, such as the LA28 Games. It is simply not workable to expect that the limited number of local, state and federal officials with counter-UAS authority can provide the full range of security protections needed.

Invest in detection: Without effective detection systems, it is not possible to identify unauthorized or potentially malicious drones--let alone take the needed actions to address the threat. Event organizers, local officials and nearby critical infrastructure entities should start building effective detection systems now.

Exercise: Coordination mechanisms, response procedures and command centers need to be tested. LA28 organizers should repeatedly exercise the full process, from detection to decision and response, across a range of circumstances and in coordination with all relevant partners, to identify and address gaps while there is still time.

Educate: Most of the drones seized from restricted airspace during the FIFA World Cup were reportedly operated by noncompliant hobbyists and others unaware of the flight restrictions rather than malicious or criminal actors. A sustained public awareness campaign should focus on recreational and commercial drone operators in the region. This would enable security resources to focus more clearly on potentially malicious threats.

The drone threat will continue to evolve until the LA28 opening ceremony on July 14, 2028. Now is the time to establish the capabilities, partnerships, procedures and laws to adapt and respond effectively.